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EXCESSIVE FINES
United States Constitution Amendment VIII:
[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
New York Constitution Article I, Section 5:
[Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted...
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NASSAU COUNTY
County of Nassau v. Canavan'
(decided August 22, 2001)
Michaele Canavan was arrested by Nassau County Police
for driving while intoxicated. Subsequent to her arrest, Nassau
County commenced a civil forfeiture action targeting the vehicle
she was driving at the time of her arrest, pursuant to the Nassau
County Administrative Code.2 Canavan argued that seizure of her
automobile constituted an excessive fine in violation of her rights
'2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Aug 22, 2001). This
opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the official reports.
2 Id at **3; Nassau County Administrative Code, § 8-7.0 (g) 3, states in
pertinent part, "[T]he County of Nassau may commence a civil action for
forfeiture to the County of Nassau of the proceeds of a crime, substituted
proceeds of a crime or instrumentality of a crime seized incident to an arrest for
a misdemeanor crime or petty offense or upon conviction for such misdemeanor
crime or petty offense against any person having an interest in such property.";
see also Nassau County Administrative Code, § 8-7.0 (g) 1 (d) stating in
pertinent part, "'Instrumentality of a crime means any property, other than real
property... whose use contributes directly and materially to the commission of
any offense."; see also Charlie LeDuff, Nassau Joins In Seizing Cars In D.W.I
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, February 25, 1999, at B 1.
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under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
its parallel counterpart of the New York State Constitution, Article
I, Section 5, because it represented a greater penalty then would
have been assessed for the offense to which she plead guilty.
3
Nassau County contended that the seizure was constitutionally
permissible.4
Nassau County Police seized the defendant's automobile
subsequent to her arrest for driving while intoxicated and
speeding.5  The arresting officer's deposition stated that the
defendant had a blood alcohol content of .15%, which warranted
the charge of driving while intoxicated.6 However, the defendant
plead guilty to driving while impaired by the consumption of
alcohol, a traffic infraction.7 In addition, the defendant plead guilty
to speeding. 8 She was sentenced to pay a fine of three hundred
dollars for the charge of driving while impaired and one hundred
dollars for speeding.9 Furthermore, the defendant had to complete
a drinking-driver program and her license was suspended for
ninety days.'0
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Provides in pertinent part: "[E]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides in pertinent part: "[E]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted .... ; Canavan, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551, at **3-
4. The defendant stated in her affidavit that her car was worth approximately
$6,500.00 and the maximum fine that could have been imposed on her for
driving while impaired was $500.00. Id. at **8.
4 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551, at **4.
5 Id. at **2.
6 Id; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.2 (McKinney 1997), stating in
pertinent part, "[N]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has
.10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the persons blood...."
7 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551, at **2; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1192.1 (McKinney 1997), stating in pertinent part, "[N]o person shall operate
a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such motor vehicle is
impaired by the consumption of alcohol."
8 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551, at **3; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1180 (McKinney 1997), stating in pertinent part, "[N]o person shall drive
a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing."
9 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551, at **2-3.
'o Id. at **3.
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The Canavan court commenced its analysis noting that the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
corresponding section of the New York State Constitution provides
that the government shall not impose excessive fines."
Furthermore, when property is seized in a civil forfeiture
proceeding, the court must apply an Eighth Amendment Excessive
Fines Clause analysis when the statute authorizing the seizure has
as one of its objectives punishment.' 2  Therefore, the court
reasoned that if the forfeiture constitutes payment to a
governmental entity as punishment for an offense, the statute or
regulation that authorizes the forfeiture is subject to review under
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.' 3 The
Canavan court concluded that the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles
under the pertinent Nassau County Administrative Code serves
both a punitive and deterrent purpose, therefore, the seizure and
forfeiture is subject to an Excessive Fines Clause review. 14
The Canavan court noted that in Austin v. United States,1
5
the United States Supreme Court did not delineate a test or
standard for conducting an Excessive Fines Clause review.
6
Although the Court applied the Excessive Fines Clause to the facts
of the case, the Court declined to establish a multifactor test for
determining whether forfeiture is constitutionally excessive,
delegating this task to the lower courts.' 7 In Austin, the petitioner
was indicted for possession of narcotics and the United States filed
an in rem action seeking forfeiture of petitioner's mobile home and
auto body shop.' 8 The question to be answered in this case was
whether forfeiture could be considered punishment.' 9 The Austin
court held that "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture
in particular historically, have been understood, at least in part, as
"Id.
12 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 551 at **4-5; see also Austin 509 U.S. 602,
618 (1993).
13 Id..
4 ld. at **5.
15 509 U.S. at 602.
16 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 551 at **5.
17 509 U.S. at 622.
18 Id. at 604.
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punishment., 20 Consequently, following the Austin decision,
several tests were developed and adopted by the United States
Supreme Court, lower federal courts and New York State courts to
21determine whether forfeiture is excessive.
The Canavan court adopted the proportionality-
instrumentality test formulated by the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Milbrand.22 This test was also applied by the Appellate
Division, Third Department in In the Matter of Attorney-General
of the State of New York v. One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler.23
The Milbrand court stated:
[T]he factors to be considered by a court in
determining whether a proposed in rem forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause should include
(1) the harshness of the forfeiture.., in comparison
to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence
that could be imposed on the perpetrator of such an
offense; (2) the relationship between the property
20 Id. at 618.
21 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (holding "a
punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense."); United States v.
Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1182 (1996)
(holding the "appropriate excessiveness analysis entails a multi-factor test
combining the principles of both instrumentality and proportionality."); United
States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365'(4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1082
(1995). (holding "in determining excessiveness of an in rem forfeiture under the
Eighth Amendment, a court must apply a three-part instrumentality test"); In the
Matter of Attorney-General v. One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler, 217 A.D.2d
342, 346, 636 N.Y.S.2d 868, 872 (3rd Dep't 1996) (adopting a combination of
the instrumentality and proportionality tests); Grinberg v. Safir, 181 Misc. 2d
444, 458, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 327 (Sup. Ct. 1999), affd, 266 A.D.2d 43, 698
N.Y.S. 218 (1st Dep't 1999) (holding the forfeiture at issue not to be excessive
under any of the three tests: proportionality, instrumentality or a' mixed
instrumentality-proportionality analysis).
22 58 F.3d at 848 (holding that the government's seizure of defendant's land,
which was used to grow marijuana, did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment).
23 217 A.D.2d at 348, 636 N.Y.S 2d at 872, (applying the Milbrand factors,
determining that the seizure of defendant's automobile, which was used to carry
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and the offense, including whether use of the
property in the offense was (a) important to the
success of the illegal activity, (b) deliberate and
planned or merely incidental and fortuitous, and (c)
temporally or spatially extensive; and (:3) the role
and degree of culpability of the owner of the
24property.
The Canavan court determined that the second and third
Milbrand factors were satisfied because the defendant's offense,
combined with her in-fact ownership of the vehicle, met the
requirements of the second and third factors of the Milbrand test.25
In analyzing the first factor of the Milbrand test, the Canavan court
was required to determine whether the forfeiture of Canavan's
automobile was overly harsh.26 The Canavan court determined that
although loss of the automobile was a major inconvenience, there
was no claim by the defendant or indication by the circumstances
that ownership of the automobile was vital to Canavan's daily
life.27 Although the Canavan court conceded that the value of the
automobile was much greater than the fine actually imposed,
after applying the combination instrumentality-proportionality
factors of Milbrand, the court held that the forfeiture of the
defendant's vehicle did not constitute an excessive fine under
either the United States or New York State Constitutions.29
In a decision rendered one year before Milbrand, the Fourth
Circuit, in United States v. Chandler30 developed a three-part
24 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 847-48 (combining the principles of both
proportionality and instrumentality).
25 Canavan, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 551, at **6-7 ("[W]ithout the car there would
have been no offense, and the decision to drive after drinking can be nothing but
deliberate").
26 Id. at **7.
27 Id. at **8.
28 Id. The defendant stated in her affidavit that her car was valued at $6,500.00.
She was fined $400.00 by the criminal court and received a ninety-day license
suspension. The maximum fine that could have been imposed for driving while
impaired was $500.00, the maximum jail time was fifteen days and the
maximum period of license suspension was ninety days. Id.29 Id. at **10.
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instrumentality test to be applied when determining the
excessiveness of an in rem forfeiture under the Eighth
Amendment.3 ' The Chandler test considers the following factors:
(1) the nexus between the offense and the property
and the extent of the property's role in the offense,
(2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the
possibility of separating offending property that can
readily be separated from the offender. In
measuring the strength and extent of the nexus
between the property and the offense, a court may
take into account the following factors: (1) whether
the use of the property in the offense was deliberate
and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous; (2)
whether the property was important to the success
of the illegal activity; (3) the time during which the
property was illegally used and the special extent of
its use; (4) whether its illegal use was an isolated
event or had been repeated; and (5) whether the
purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the
property was to carry out the offense. 2
Although the United States Supreme Court declined in
Austin to establish a multifactor test for determining whether a
forfeiture is constitutionally excessive, the Court established a
proportionality test five years later in United States v. Bajakajian.3
In Bajakajian, the defendant attempted to leave the United States
while in possession of over $10,000.00 without satisfying the
3, Id. at 365 (rejecting a proportionality test in favor of an instrumentality test,
determined that the government seizure of defendant's land, which was used as
an instrument in carrying out numerous drug transactions, did not violate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
32 Id. The court further clarified that,
No one factor is dispositive but, to sustain a forfeiture against
an Eighth Amendment challenge, the court must be able to
conclude, under the totality of circumstances, that the property
was a substantial and meaningful instrumentality in the
commission of the offense, or would have been, had the
.offensive conduct been carried out as intended.
33 524 U.S. at 321.
[Vol 18
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reporting requirement, as mandated by federal law.34 Federal law
also required that a person convicted of willfully violating this
reporting requirement shall forfeit to the government "any
property... involved in such offense., 35 At the time of his arrest,
the respondent was in possession of $357,144.00.36 The
government sought full forfeiture of the respondent's currency as
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 982 (a) (1).7 In its analysis, the court
stated, "[T]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity
of the offense that it is designed to punish. ' 8 Accordingly, the
Court held that "a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines
Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a
defendant's offense., 39 Under the Court's newly established test,
the forfeiture of respondent's entire $357,144.00 would violate the
Excessive Fines Clause because it is "grossly disproportional" to
the appropriate punishment for the offense committed. °
The Federal and New York State Constitutions are
essentially identical in language, both providing for the protection
against government imposition of excessive fines as mandated by
their respective Excessive Fines Clauses.41 Both constitutions
require an Excessive Fines Clause analysis when the government
seeks forfeiture of property.4 2 The difference, however, between
the federal and state court analysis is the particular Excessive Fines
Clause test that each court applies. In the federal courts, prior to
the decision in Bajakajian, the United States Supreme Court had
not yet established a test to analyze forfeitures under the Excessive
34 d. at 324.
35 Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 982 (a) (1) (2002).
36 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324.
37 Id. at 326.
38 Id. at 334.
39 Id. The Court further stated, "[I]f the amount of the forfeiture is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense, it is unconstitutional."
Id. at 337.40 Id. at 337.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII., N.Y. CONST. art. I § 5.
42 See Grinberg v. Safir, 181 Misc. 2d 444, 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 326-27
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (holding "New York's Excessive Fines Clause
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Fines Clause of the United States Constitution. 3 Lower federal
courts in the Fourth and Second Circuits did, however, establish
two distinct tests, as delineated in the Chandler and Milbrand
decisions.44 However, since Bajakajian, the Second Circuit, in
United States v. United States Currency In The Sum Of Fifty Seven
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Five Dollars,45 disregarded the
previously applied instrumentality test and adopted the "grossly
disproportional" standard set forth in Bajakajian.4
New York State courts have recently decided cases dealing
with the forfeiture of automobiles from persons arrested for driving
while intoxicated or driving while impaired. In Grinberg v. Safir,47
the defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated.4 He
challenged New York City's vehicle forfeiture policy as an
excessive fine, in violation of the Federal and New York State
Constitutions.49 In rendering its decision, the Grinberg court
adopted all three tests stating, "[W]hile the forfeiture sought may
be deemed a 'fine,' it is not excessive when analyzed under any of
the three tests advanced for measuring excessiveness:
proportionality, instrumentality or a mixed instrumentality-
proportionality analysis." 5 The Grinberg court held that the City's
forfeiture policy did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause.5'
However, the courts in Canavan and One Green 1993 Four Door
Chrysler opted for a more narrow construction; both adopted the
combination instrumentality-proportionality test as delineated in
Milbrand.
In One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler, New York State
Police stopped an automobile occupied by, and owned by one of
43Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
44 See Chandler, 36 F.3d at 358 (establishing the instrumentality test);
Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 841 (establishing the combination instrumentality-
proportionality test).45 No. 97-6023, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23529 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 1998)
4 Id. at *6 (requiring the district court ascertain whether full forfeiture of
defendant's currency that defendant failed to report was grossly disproportional
to the gravity of the defendant's offense).
47 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 458, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
48Id at 447, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
49 Id. at 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
50 Id. at 458, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
5' Id. at 459, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
258 [Vol 18
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52the respondent's for a traffic infraction . Prior to stopping the
respondent's vehicle, the police had suspected them of possessing
and selling cocaine.53 After stopping the respondents, the police
discovered what was later determined to be 5.4 grams of cocaine
on the floor of the automobile and 2.9 grams in the personal
possession of one of the respondents, who was the actual owner of
the vehicle. 54  The petitioners initiated a forfeiture proceeding
against the seized vehicle because it was used to carry and conceal
a controlled substance.55 The court agreed that, pursuant to Austin,
the forfeiture is subject to the restrictions imposed regarding
governmental seizure of property under both the Federal and New
York State Constitutions.56 In analyzing the excessiveness of the
governmental seizure of the respondent's vehicle, the court
determined that the appropriate criteria to employ are both the
instrumentality and proportionality tests. 57 The court held that the
forfeiture of the respondent's vehicle was not excessive and did not
violate her constitutional rights5 8
In conclusion, the federal and New York State courts differ
in the tests that are applied to determine if forfeiture is excessive
under the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States and New
York State Constitutions. Accordingly, in New York State cases, a
proportionality-instrumentality analysis was performed in both
Canavan and One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler, while the state
court in Grinberg, analyzed its case utilizing all three tests;
proportionality, instrumentality and the combination
proportionality-instrumentality test.59 The federal courts differ in





5 6 d. at 345, 636 N.Y.S.2d. at 870.
57 One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler, 217 A.D.2d at 346, 636 N.Y.S.2d. at
871. (stating "the test enunciated in Milbrand properly balances the remedial
and punitive elements and applies the relevant factors necessary for making an
excessiveness determination under the Eighth Amendment").
5 8 Id. at 348, 636 N.Y.S.2d. at 872.
59 See Canavan, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 551 at **6; One Green 1993 Four
Door Chrysler, 217 A.D.2d at 346, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 871; Grinberg, 181 Misc.
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their application of the excessiveness analysis as well. Thus, the
Chandler court used only the three-part instrumentality test, while
the court in Milbrand employed a combination proportionality-
60instrumentality test. In Bajakajian, the United States Supreme
Court utilized a proportionality test but went a bit further by stating
that the punishment must be "grossly disproportional" to the
offense regarding forfeiture in order to be in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.6' Similarly, the Second Circuit in United States
Currency in the Sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Eight Hundred
Dollars, utilized the grossly disproportional standard set forth in
Bajakajian.62
Based on the recent federal and state cases, it appears that
the trend is to apply either in whole or in part, the proportionality
test as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Bajakajian.
Robert Kronenberg
60 See Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 847; Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365.
61 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
62 See United States Currency in the Sum of Fifty Seven Thousand Eight
Hundred Thirty Five Dollars, No. 97-6023, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23529 at *6.
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